Good Neighbourliness: Another Definiendum for Nigeria’s Strategic Autonomy and Sub-regional Integration
Bola A. Akinterinwa
Good neighbourliness in international relations is so important to the extent that lack of it prompts violence and reckless use of force. One major rationale for the provision of the principle of non-intervention in the United Nations Charter is the need to ensure good neighbourliness, very brotherly relations, as the fulcrum of peaceful coexistence. Most unfortunately, however, good neighbourliness is only a sermon that is generally preached but hardly respected in international relations unless as a result of force majeure.
Because of the need for togetherness, protection of political sovereignty, development, and common interests, the Conference of Independent African States (Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic) was held in Accra, Ghana from 15 April to 22nd April, 1958. When more African countries acceded to national and international sovereignty in the early 1960s, the need for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was contemplated and established in 1963. More interestingly, the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action was adopted and also further complemented with the signing of the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community which underscored continental integration through regionalisation by dividing Africa into five regions to give further impetus to, and changing the status of, the then existing sub-regions to regions.
Today, Africa’s leading regional organisation, ECOWAS, began in 1975 with 16 original members (16 ratifications), then declined to 15 with the withdrawal of Mauritania in 1999, and further to 12 with the withdrawal in 2024 of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to form the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES). Forming a sub-region within the ECOWAS region is consistent with Article 1(e) of the 1991 Abuja Treaty. Consequently, in celebrating the ECOWAS at 50, and responding to the challenges of the AES, Nigeria needs to underscore its good neighbourliness policy as a basis of her quest for strategic autonomy by establishing a new sub-region to comprise Nigeria and her immediate neighbours as a desideratum.
Good Neighbourliness as Basis
Good neighbourliness is one of the seven foundational principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy: reciprocity, non-alignment, friendliness with everyone, non-interference, non-intervention, peaceful co-existence, and defence of Africa’s interests. As noted in his October 7, 1960 membership acceptance speech at the UN, Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, said ‘it is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organisation.’ Thus Nigeria pledged to promote peaceful coexistence. He backed this up with another pledge that Nigeria did not have any territorial expansionist ambitions.
More importantly, Tafawa Balewa informed that Nigeria hoped ‘to work with other African States for the progress of Africa and to assist in bringing all African territories to a state of responsible independence.’ And perhaps most significantly, Alhaji Balewa also said ‘we do not intend to ally ourselves as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. We are committed to uphold the principles upon which the UN is founded.’
Without any whiff of doubt, all the points raised by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa are indispensable constituents of good neighbourliness. Non-expansionist intention cannot but be very reassuring to territorially small neighbours. Working with other countries to promote Africa’s progress is quite encouraging. Consequently, consciously promoting a good neighbourly policy as a special instrument of Nigeria’s quest for strategic autonomy and Nigeria’s foreign relations is what is necessary at the level of Nigeria-Neighbours sub-regional alliance which is needed to build a border that can unite the AES and ECOWAS at 50. In other words, ECOWAS and Nigeria need another sub-region in the West African region, not as a counter-weight, but as a complement, even though Cameroun falls under the Central Africa Region of Africa. A Nigeria-Francophone-Neighbours Alliance (AFNA), constituting a sub-region has the great potential to boost integration and better understanding. All Nigeria’s neighbours are Francophone and the general thinking in Francophone Africa is the need to delink with every aspect of neo-colonial domination. In this regard, rather than allowing the neighbours to fraternise with alternative foreign countries, Nigeria should be prepared to serve as a non-colonial friend and reliable ally. Nigeria should be the coordinating centre of the Francophone innermost circle. This cannot but also serve all the purposes of the principle of peaceful coexistence.
As laid down by the 1955 Afro-Asian Bandung Conference, organised by Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation, as well as to oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism, ten basic principles were necessary for the maintenance and promotion of peaceful coexistence. They include mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-intervention, political self-determination, and sovereign equality, etc. The ten principles were an improvement on the 1954 five principles of peaceful coexistence adopted within the context of the India-China negotiations for solidarity.
Put differently, it is when there is lack of trust, injustice, inequality and misunderstanding that peaceful coexistence becomes impossible to exist. It can only exist if there is harmony and non-violence, if promotion of peace is made a deliberate policy, and when there is respect for differences, cooperation and collaboration. The peaceful coexistence of linguistic and cultural differences can be mutually benefitting, especially in terms of sub-regional integration. Cooperation and collaboration is a major instrument of dialogue and direct communication. And most interestingly, the purpose of Nigeria’s strategic autonomy is best served when it begins at the level of the immediate neighbourhood, because it is generally accepted that Nigeria’s national security is intertwined with the national security of all the contiguous neighbours.
This point is a truism in Nigeria bearing in mind her civil war experiences. Even though good neighbourliness was recognised as a foreign policy principle since 1960, it was the civil war experience that actually gave meaning to it. The Red Cross tried to use Dahomey, now Benin Republic, as a base to send alleged relief materials to secessionist Biafra. The Federal Government discovered that the reported pretext of providing relief materials was also taken advantage of to arm the secessionist. The relief materials were packaged with arms and ammunitions. It was the lesson learnt from the experience that gave a fillip to the need for the policy of good neighbourliness in Nigeria’s foreign relations.
The experience is still relevant today to learn from. The West Africa region is already divided against itself but the division can still be taken advantage of. As noted above, the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the ECOWAS to form the AES is legal because it is consistent with the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. Therefore, promoting a new sub-region with Nigeria at the epicentre will be most helpful to the ECOWAS at 50 in not only addressing its current challenge of threats of disintegration but in also particularly charting the way forward in the next fifty years. The new sub-region will also be legitimate.
True, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will be 50 years old this coming May 28, 2025. The anniversary requires deeper reflections than just seeking to mark or celebrate it. One main reason is the Francophone challenge and headache. The Francophone countries began efforts at regional integration before the Anglophone, Arabophone and Lusophone Africa began theirs. There was, for example, the establishment of the Union Douanière de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UDAO: West African Customs Union) in 1959, which was replaced by the Union Douanière et Economique de L’Afrique de l’Ouest (UDEAO: West African Economic and Customs Union) in 1966. Both of them could not thrive. This was in spite of France who was quite instrumental to their making for reasons of identity and the special agreements done with her former colonies. The agreements gave special privileges and immunities that enabled France to operate freely in their countries in a preferential manner and to the detriment of other Western powers.
When efforts were being made to establish the ECOWAS in 1972, a Treaty of Abidjan was done on 17 April, 1973 by Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta to establish the Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (C.E.A.O.: West African Economic Community). The cardinal objective was to promote economic cooperation and integration among the Member States. It was therefore presented as a precursor to the ECOWAS in the making. The truth was actually to contain the ECOWAS or to take precedence before it, and to ensure and sustain Francophone identity within the framework of the ECOWAS. And true enough, when the ECOWAS was birthed on 28 May 1975, following the entry into force of the Abidjan Treaty establishing the CEAO on January 1, 1974, the conduct and management of ECOWAS was frequently fraught with rivalry with the CEAO.
Again, even though the CEAO has gone into désuétude, the same ECOWAS of yesterday and of today still has to cope with a new rivalry with the Francophone, the Alliance des États de Sahel (AES: Alliance of Sahel States) in particular. It is against this background that Nigeria should begin to look at good neighbourliness as a new framework for her quest for strategic autonomy and evolving a new sub-regional alliance in the mania of the AES.
Strategic Autonomy and Sub-regional Integration
As told by Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, strategic autonomy is the fulcrum of the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT). Interpretatively, it means whatever is contemplated as an undertaking is largely informed by the need for strategic autonomy. In this regard, what should we mean by strategic autonomy? Grosso modo, strategic autonomy is about self-reliance. Self-reliance is about capacity to do and undo without undue influence by anyone or any country. It is essentially about politico-military power to pursue well-defined objectives, domestic and foreign.
More importantly, strategic autonomy varies from one country to the other, especially in terms of its content. For example, the main purpose of the strategic objective of the European Union is about not depending heavily on the United States, to have capacity to defend Europe, while the objectives of the strategic autonomy of China and Russia are different. Explained differently, Jing Huang in the China International Strategy Review, says EU’s strategic autonomy is ‘to navigate through the transition in global order and to maintain its values and interests in the up-coming order. In other words, EU Strategic Autonomy is a hegemonic game both inside and beyond the EU.’
On the contrary, one objective of the Chinese strategic autonomy is made clear in the strategic goals of the Made in China 2025 plan. It is ‘to end reliance on international technology and upgrade its industrial capability and smart manufacturing by ensuring that innovation, product quality, efficiency, and integration drive manufacturing across ten key industries.’ As noted earlier in 2020, China wants to be a ‘moderately developed economy by 2035.’
What is important to note here is that there is no limitation to the scope of objectives of strategic autonomy and every country has its own understanding of strategic autonomy? In this regard, what are the contents or requirements that can guarantee self-reliance and capacity building in terms of strategic autonomy? This question arises because Nigeria’s strategic autonomy is not, and should not, be simply seen as a fulcrum, but particularly as a strategic objective within the context of the BRICS, within the framework of the strategic autonomy of the Global South and the strategic autonomy of the ECOWAS and Africa as a whole. The objectives of Nigeria’s strategic autonomy cannot but be to have financial autonomy, vibrant economy, strong and dependable military, a stable and secure Nigeria, as well as be able to align or not to align based on her national interests. Nigeria’s strategic autonomy as envisaged by Ambassador Tuggar is about self-preservation with capacity to act internationally without the whims and caprices of any other sovereign state.
At the economico-security level, President Emmanuel Macron of France and PBAT of Nigeria jointly said that ‘when we have mutual interests, we work together. It is in our mutual interest to encourage private sector investment between our two countries. It is in our mutual interest to develop thriving creative and cultural industries that will create jobs for Nigerian and French young people. It is in our mutual interest to make sure that the Gulf of Guinea is safe for all economic activities. It is in our mutual interest to strengthen our food systems so that they are stable, secure, and not over-reliant on imports’ (vide africareport.com).
All the foregoing areas mentioned by the two Presidents fall squarely within the framework of Nigeria’s strategic autonomy which has to be at two levels: domestic and foreign. In other words, capacity to operate without interferences at the level of immediate neighbourhood of Nigeria, that is, sub-regional strategic autonomy, should be differentiated from the level of Nigeria’s strategic autonomy in the fourth foreign policy concentric circle as typologised by Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari. This is the external dimension of Nigeria’s strategic autonomy
We observe and posit here that Nigeria’s strategic autonomy must have a constructive foundation; that the foundation of the autonomy cannot but be a sub-regional strategic autonomy, and that this has become a desideratum because Nigeria’s internal security is intertwined with that of her immediate neighbours as rightly argued by Professor Gambari. Even though Nigeria and the immediate neighbours are already engaged in several security and development projects, such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission, there is still the need for a special Alliance of Nigeria-Francophone-Neighbours (ANFN) as a basis of fostering sub-regional integration. If the logic of re-defining Africa as a continent of five regions is to fast track continental integration, then, fostering a sub-regional integration, which the AES is all about now, makes the need for a special Nigeria-Niger partnership and a Nigeria-Immediate Neighbours Sub-region a desideratum. Nigeria’s Strategic autonomy should therefore be organised to begin at the sub-regional level as Nigeria’s national security cannot be separated from the security of the neighbours.
And true enough, integration can be of many types at the operational level: vertical, horizontal, and backward, integration. Vertical operation, which also can still be of various types, is when the businesses in the sub-region are all directly in charge of and able to control their supply chain, when they take ownership of their suppliers, distributors and retail locations. Vertical integration is noteworthy when bearing in mind that the Francophone countries are seriously complaining about the Frenchification of their politico-economic systems. Therefore, establishing a Nigerian-Neighbours’ sub-region can stop France’s mainmise. As such, advantages and disadvantages can be expected, but all the challenges have the potential to be collectively and more meaningfully addressed.
In the context of horizontal integration, this is when the sub-regional businesses merge with one another in the same industry, when they are operating at the same level in the value chain. Backward integration, also considered as a form of vertical integration, involves the expansion of roles in fulfilment of completed tasks up the supply chain. Put differently, backward integration ‘is when a company buys another company that supplies the products or services needed for production’ (vide investopedia.com).
In sum, the AES is already forging ahead with its sub-regional integration in various ramifications, placing emphasis on the need for self-identity, self-reliance, and self-promotion. The AES countries not only withdrew their membership of the ECOWAS, but also their membership of the Francophonie. They constituted themselves into a confederation. In Burkina Faso, for example, the Ibrahim Traoré regime committed itself to fighting terrorism and restoring the territorial integrity of the country. The defence and security forces were reorganised. About 10,000 people were recruited into the military. New military equipment was acquired. In fact, 90,000 volunteers were recruited for the purposes of the defence of the Homeland.
In the Republic of Niger, the Tchiani regime differentiated among national language, working languages, and spoken languages of Niger. Hausa language was adopted on April 09, 2025, as the new lingua franca of the country. It replaced the French language which, along with English, are made working languages. Nine local languages were officially listed as ‘the spoken languages of Niger, They include Zarma-Songhay, Fula, Kanuri, Gourmanche, and Arabic. Niger has a population of about 26 million and majority of Nigériens are already Hausa speaking. Only about 13% of them speak French. The change and choice of Hausa is therefore a welcome development. What is noteworthy, however, is what prompted the change and choice: anti-colonial considerations. This is what Nigeria should be more concerned with in her foreign policy strategic calculations. Additionally and more concernedly, Niger has placed entry restrictions on Nigerians holding ECOWAS passports, preferring holders of valid Nigerian international passports. This is basically a rejection of the ECOWAS and whatever it stands for. The story is not different in Mali.
Mali has adopted a new mining code aimed at increasing local ownership and state involvement in all mining projects. The Code enables Government to have 10% share in mining projects, as well as buy additional 20% within the first two years of the project implementation. All these developments clearly point to the unlikelihood of the AES coming back to the ECOWAS as individual member states. Returning to the ECOWAS as a sub-regional group cannot be ruled out. Consequently, and bearing in mind that countries like Senegal and the Côte d’Ivoire have the potential to still join the AES by force of necessity, and also considering that the incumbent President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, shares the anti-neo-colonialist sentiments of the Francophones, Nigeria has very limited options in her foreign policy direction in the ECOWAS region.
Grosso modo, what we are saying is that Africa should underscore sub-regional integration more than regional integration in the quest for continental integration. The belief of African leaders, with the signing of the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and dividing Africa into five regions, was to fast track continental integration at various levels. As there are growing challenges at the regional level which are difficult to contain, we observe that attempting to nip in the bud the challenges at the level of the sub-regions can be helpful. In this regard, if we remember that Africa’s development is an important objective and component of Nigeria’s policy, that Africa is the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, it cannot but be in the larger and long-term interest of Nigeria to make her sub-region very stable politically and economically. Unlike many regions of the world where the investment default rate is high, the same is not true of Africa. As recalled by Dr Akinwunmi Adesina, the President of the African Development Bank, the default rate in Latin America is 13%. That of Eastern Europe is 10%. In Africa, it has been only 1.7% in the past 14 years. In other words, investments risks are currently low in Nigeria’s immediate neighbourhood. This is one good reason why Nigeria should work toward a Nigeria-Francophone-Neighbours Sub-region (NFNS). In the event of a Nigerian sub-region, investment opportunities are likely to be greater.
